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Abstract: In the mid-1980’s Mexico successfully brought down ita high
rate ofinflation by using the exchange rate as nominal anchor in combi
nation with strict fiscal discipline, tight monetary policy, and incomes po
licy. Phispaperdiscussestheroleofexchangeratepolieyasnominalanchor
in Mexico and develops the inflation target as the monetary framework
for anchoring prices. It also describes how Mexico is applying this frame
work while shifting to a more flexible exchange regime and discusses the
role ofthenewlyindependentcentralbankandmonetarypolicyinkeeping
inflation under control while shiftingnominal anchors. Phis paper descri
bes the situations as seen in early 1994, andmakes no attempt te describe
the events that led to the 1994 crisis and ita aftermath.
Resumen: A mediados de los años ochenta, México logró bajar sus altas
tasas de inflación utilizando el tipo de cambio como anda nominal combi
nándola con una estricta disciplina fiscal, política monetaria restrictiva
ypolítica deingresos. Estetrabajoestudiael desempeño de dichapolíticay
analiza la meta inflacionaria como estrategia monetaria para anclar los
precios. Se explica cómo en México se utiliza este marco de trabajo al
tiempo que se cambia a un régimen de tipo de cambio más flexible. Se
discute también el papel que el Banco Central y la politica monetaria
tienen para mantener la inflación bajo control en el momento en que se
están cambiando las anclas nominales de la economía. Este trabajo des
cribe las situaciones tal y como se percibían a principios de 1994 y no las
causas que originaron la crisis de ese año y sus repercusiones.
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I
n the mid-1980s Chile, Israel and Mexico successfully brought down
their high rates of inflation by using the exchange rate (ER) as a
nominal anchor in combination with strict fiscal discipline, tight
monetary policy, and incomes policy.’ Initially, to stabilize inflationary
expectations and to assure the gradual reduction ofthe domestic rate
of inflation, policy-makers fixed the nominal exchange rate below
market expectations and balanced the fiscal accounts. In a second
stage, to avoid excessive real appreciation ofthe exchange rate result
ingfrom domestic prices increasingfasterthan international ones and
to assure the sustainabiity ofthe economic adjustment, the authori
ties shifted first from a fixed nominal exchange rate to a crawlmg peg
regime, and second, to an exchange rate band.
The shift to greater exchange rate flexibility combined with tight
fiscal and monetary policy enabled the three countries to gain credi
bility in the economic adjustment and to sustain the fali in the rate of
domesticinflation. Yet, the use ofthe exchangerateto anchordomestic
prices led market participants to form future price expectationsbased
on exchange rate fluctuations; and this close link between exchange
rate fiuctuations and price expectationsprevented policy-makersfrom
using the exchange rate to absorb external and domestic shocks. The
three countries offerexamples oftwo opposingproblemsregardingthis
link. On the one hand there is Chile that opted for a real exchange
rate target. 2 To encourage the growth in exports and to sustain eco
nomic growth, the Chilean authorities opted for targeting the real
exchange rate. To this end, the authorities decided to realign every
month the central parity ofthe exchange rate band with the differen
tial between domestic and international price increases. By targeting
the real exchange rate the authorities indexed future price infiation
to past inflation, thus limiting the progress in lowering the domestic
inflation rate. Chile brought the domestic inflation rate down from
over 1 000 percent in the mid-1970s to about 15 percent in the 1990,
but the inflation rate refused to fail below 10 percent.
On the other hand there is Mexico that opted for lowering the
domestic inflation rate to single digits. 3 The emphasis on bringing
the domesticinfiationrate to internationalleveis and the concernwith
1 e Helpman, Leiderman and Bufman (1993) for a comparative discuasion onthese coun
tries’ experience with exchange rata policy and bands.
2 See R. Vergara (1994) for a discussion ofexchange rate policy in Chile.
See Banco de México ( 1994b) for a discuasion ofexchange rate and monetary policy.
the close link between e.change rate fluctuations and domestic price
expectations led the central bank to limit excessive exchangeratefluc
tuations. Until late-1993 the central bank used an inner-intervention
band to limit exchange rate fiuctuations, and in 1994 the centralbank
intervenedheavily to keep the exchangerate within the exchange rate
band agreed in the social pact between the government, the workers
and entrepreneurs. In contrast with Chile, Mexico made substantial
progress in loweringthe domestic inflation rate-reaching 7 percent in
1994. But the emphasis on infiation —in combination with strongsta
bilization and capital inflows— led to the real appreciation ofthe ex
change rate and to high realinterestrates, which mayhave weakened
the economic recovery. The use ofthe exchange rate to stabilize price
expectations and the faster increase in domestic prices relative to in
ternational ones in combination with the strong capital inflows, led to
the appreciation ofthe real exchange rate; and the central bankinter
ventions to defend the exchange rate within the band, led to the high
real interest rates.
Countries, such as Chile, Israel and Mexico, that have been suc
cessfulincontrollinginflationaryexpectationsusingthe exchangerate
as the nominal anchor confrontthe problemofhow to de-linkexchange
rate fluctuations from future price expectations. That is, how to shift
from an exchange rate to an inflation target as the nominal anchor
while continuing to make progress in reducing the domestic inflation
rate. It is often argued that a sudden shift to an inflation target could
lead to greater exchange rate fluctuation and because price expecta
tions are linked to exchange rate fluctuations, infiationary expec
tations would result. Therefore, a key policy question for these coun
tries is: how to de-link future price expectations from exchange rate
fluctuations, in other words, how to shift nominal anchors? This ques
tion is particularly relevant for countries exposed to external and in
ternal shocks, and thus requiring greater exchange rate flexibility. 4
The paper analyzes the transitional problems ofshifting nominal
anchors and offers a framework for using inflation targets to anchor
nominal prices. To illustrate the problems of policy coordination in
transition we took the case ofMexico before the 1994 crisis which was
in the process of shifting nominal anchors and had announced its de-
Countries less exposed to shocks, nr that have flexible labor markets can opt for a fixed
exchange rata and absorb shocks through changas m the current accountbr changes in tite real
wage, or both.
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cision to shift to an inflation target. 5 Mexico is a good example of a
complex transition to low inflation: it combines the cominitment by an
independent central bank to adopt an inflation target framework for
anchoring prices, with the commitment to an exchange rate band in
the context ofa social pact which de-facto links exchange rate changes
to nominal wage increases.
The paper is organized in three sections. Section A discusses the
role ofexchange rate policy as a nominal anchor in Mexico. Section B
developstheinflationtarget asthe monetaryframeworkfor anchoring
pricesand explainshowMexicois applyingthisframeworkwhileshift
ing to a more flexible exchange rate regime. It discusses the role ofthe
newly independent central bank and monetary policy in keeping in
flation under control while shifting nominal anchors. Section C ana
lyzes the international evidence and reviews the monetary framework
that developed countries use to keep inflation under control.
Although Mexico feli into the December 1994 crisis in the process
of shifting nominal anchors, its causes and the role ofthe exchange
rate and monetary policies are not explicitly addressed in this paper.
These problems are addressed in a comparison paper where we argue
that the commitment to the nominal exchange rate anchor and the
delay in shifting nominal anchors played a key role in explaining
the crisis.6 Phis paper was prepared before the crisis took place as an
attempttolayoutaframeworkforshiftingnominal anchorsand design
a policy framework that would enable the authorities to confront the
domestic and external shocks that took place in 1994. Because thedis
cussion and the framework offered can be useful to countries that are
in the process ofshifting nominal anchors, we decided to leave the pa
per as it was originally written. It is important, however, to note that
the paper describes the situations as seen in early 1994 and makes
no attempt to describe the events that led to the 1994 crisis and its
aftermath.
A. The Role ofExchaijge Rate as a NominalAnchor
In this section we examinethe role ofexchange rate policy inthe Mexi
can anti-inflation program as seen in early 1994 when Mexico was
shiftingnominalanchors. Westartbydiscussingthe choiceofexchange
rate regime in thetransition to low inflation; we then examinethe role
played by exchange rate policy in containing inflationary expectations
and in gaining credibility; we then follow by considering the need to
shift nominal anchors; and finally we examine the role ofwage policy
when shifting nominal anchors. 7
Choosing the Exchange Rate Regime
In deciding the exchange rate regime, policy-makers should distin
guish between long-term and transitional considerations. The follow
ing explains why Mexico might have decided forgreater exchange rate
flexibility in the transition to low inflation and why in the long term
different considerations might argue for a narrower band or a fixed
exchange rate system.
Long-term Considerations
Although in the 1990s Mexico chose greater ER flexibility, in the long
term Mexico might consider anchoring the Mexican peso on the US
dollarbyintroducingacurrencyboard oragreeingon amonetaryunion
with other NAFTA countries. Indeed, starting in the mid-fifties and for
two decades, Mexico had a very favorable experience with a fixed ER
regime.
In the longrun, assuming labormobiitybetween Mexico and the
U.S.,andthepoliticalpossibilityofamonetaryunion,optimalcurrency
area considerations might favor a fairly narrow ER band anchored on
the US dollar and in the context of a monetary union. However, this
monetary union would need budgetary resources to cushion the ad
justment ofindividual countries experiencing adverse terms oftrade
or financial shocks, such as is done in the case ofthe European Mone
See Banco de México ( 1994a).
6 See Leiderinan and Thorne ( 1995). 1987.
7 See Schwartz ( 1994) for an informative description ofMexico’s exchange rate policy since
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tary System. This long-terrn view cannot be ignored in the case of
Mexico. Greaterfinancial integration and greater capital mobility under
NAFTA might enable Mexico to reduce the costly short-term adjust
ments resulting from sudden variations in the ER, and enable con
surnption and production srnoothing over time via the trade balance.
Joining a monetary union has rnacroeconomic advantages for
a country which has a less stable monetary system than the country
which it pegs its currency against, which seems to be relevant for
Mexico. Anarrow ERband might enable Mexico to importthe financial
stability ofthe U.S. Ifthe partneris also a large economy likethe U.S.,
which supplies a large share of the country’s imports, then pegging
theMexicanpesototheUS dollarwouldprovide a stronganchorforthe
domesticprice level. One shouldfinallymentionthat a narrow ERband
rnight have the advantage ofreducing transaction costs with a major
trading partner such as the United States.
Among the disadvantages ofa fixed ER regirne, one rnay mention
the slow adjustrnent ofthe real ER to structural changes which take
place as a result of domestic reforms or permanent external shocks.
In the presence ofdownwardly rigid nominal wage contracts, the ad
justrnent of the real ER will be spread over a longer time than under
a fixed ER regime. It is presumably for this reason that Mexico has
opted in the short run for sorne degree of flexibility in the ER. In the
long run, and under the stated assurnptions, a reasonable regime
might be a narrow ER band rather than a fixed ER, since this reflects
acommitmentofnotallowingsystematic deviationsfromU.S.inflation
and provides for occasional flexibiity.
Transitional Considerations
From the point ofview ofthe transition to low inflation, Mexico’s de
cision in November 1991 to adopt an ER band and in October 1992 to
have greater ER flexibility was irnportant for two reasons. First, in
spite ofits successful stabilization program, Mexico did not eliminate
its inflation differential with the U.S. In this situation confining the
ER to a narrow band would have entailed further real appreciation in
the transition, which could have raised devaluation expectations and
put a heavy burden on the stabilization effort. Continued use ofthe
ER as a nominal anchor at the cost offurther real appreciation would
also have signaled a distorted relative price with important conse
quences in terms of prq%luction. Second, the peso appreciation in real
terrns could not have been corrected through a maxi devaluation (fol
lowed by frxing the ER), or a step devaluation because it would have
undermined the credibility in the disinflation program.
Two other considerations were relevant for the transition to low
inflation in Mexico. As long as fuli credibility in price stabiiity has not
been fully established, there may have been occasional significant mis
alignments of other nominal variables such as wages or prices in anti
cipation of a relaxation of ER policy. These would have required sorne
compromise in the form of a more flexible ER policy for a liinited time.
In addition, as we mentioned earlier, one may expect important struc
tural changes inthe economy as part ofthe adjustments to NAYPA, which
will be concentrated in the next few years, and require frequent, and
possiblylarge, variations ofthe real ER. Because ofthese considerations,
it will be advantageous to have greater flexibility in the ERregime in the
transition to economic integration in the framework of NAVI’A. This mi
plies that ERflexibiiityinthe mediumrun, whichin 1994 mayhave been
reflected in the width ofthe ER band, will have to be greater than in the
long run.
Stages in Mexico’s ER Policy
In Mexico the use of the ER as a nominal anchor in the disiriflation
prograrn went through two stages. In the first stage, which lasted
approximatelyuntilNovember 1991 whentheERbandwasintroduced,
the uncertainty about the prospects ofthe prograrn and on the persist
ence with the fiscal adjustment was great, which led to inflationary
expectations in excess ofthe governrnents targets. When the ER was
used as an anchor, the policy-makers set the rate ofdevaluation below
the public’s expectations in a way which was consistent with the dis
inflation target. This led to a “credibiity battle” which entailed the
cost ofreal appreciation and possible balance ofpayment crises. This
was also the experience ofthe Chilean Tablita in the late-1970s. Simi
lar, though rnuch milder, developments took place in Israel duringthe
stabilization program. 8
In the second stage, after the program had accumulated sorne
8 See Kiguel and Liviatan (1990) for a discussion ofthe experience ofLatinAmerican coun
tries in the 1960s and 1970s.
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credibiity, which in Mexico started in November 1991, the ER ceased
to be involved in an active credibility struggle; it was used more as
a means ofpreventing a derailment ofinflation by various shocks. In
this stage, the persistence ofthe governmentwith fiscal discipline and
reforma became the main indicator ofthe commitment to disinflation,
with the nominal anchor playing a secondary role. Indeed, in a atable
economy, people do not usually know whatthe nominal anchor is; they
only know that when the need arises, the government will implement
the appropriate nominal policy instrument. The experience of Israel
and Chile suggests that in this stage inflation will continue to come
down gradually through persistence with fiscal austerity and reforma
without actively engagingin a credibility battle in the area ofnominal
anchors. It is in the second stage that a reversal ofthe real apprecia
tion, accumulated in the first stage, could be redressed by takingad
vantage ofthe faIl in inflation.
These considerations had an important influence on the para
meters of the ER band, which are the width and the rate of crawl
(slope) ofthe band. In stage one, the band was narrow because a wide
band could have been interpreted as a way to create devaluation
shocks. Given that credibility in the program was low, the public’s
expectations of devaluation exceeded the crawl of the band and any
reduction in the rate ofcrawl would have increased the gap between
the actual and expected rates ofdevaluation, thus increasingthe cost
of the credibility battle. Although during the first stage the gap
between the actual and the expected devaluation increased, the
narrow band helped stabilize inflationary expectations byreassuring
market participants against a surprise devaluation shock. The situa
tion was quite different inthe second stage. The reduced risk that the
government would create a surprise devaluation made it possible to
widen the band without the fear that it would raise inflationary
expectations, these were also the experiences of Chile and Israel. In
Mexico, this was evidenced in 1992 and 1993 when the crawl ofthe
upper band was increased from 20 to 40 centavos a day and the rate
ofinflation continued to fail, from 12 percent in 1992 to 8 percent in
1993. The widerband also providedtherequired flexibilityforadjust
ingthe real ER in response to the structural reforms and the external
shocks that took place in early 1994. In addition, the wider ER band
enabled the ER to respond to changes in expected inflation. The
band can also be widened by a discreetjump without causing ajump
in expectations.
In Mexicothe ERplicy until 1994 followed, broadiy speaking, the
description of stage one up to the renewal of the Pacto in November
1991. Before this date, the rate of crawl of the ceiling of the band
—determined by the social pacts— was gradually reduced ahead of
expectations and the band itself was narrow, with the lower bound
ofthe band remaining constant. This led to a continued real apprecia
tion accompanied by other symptoms of misalignment characteristic
ofthe Chilean Tablita-type ofpolicies.
In lime with the objectives ofthe second stage, the change ofpolicy
in November 1991 consisted ofintroducingan ER Band and in October
1992 ofwidening the ER band by doubling the rate ofcrawl to 40 cen
tavos per day (that ja, 4.6 percent annually) with the floor remaimng
fixed (see Figure 1). The change in policywas intended to allowgreater
ER flexibility. Yet, until December 1993 and as a result of the inner
intervention band, the ER remained practically constant except for
a temporaryjump followinga short-lived speculativeattackonthe peso
prior to the ratification of the NAFPA agreement in November 1993.
The lack of movement ofthe ER within the band can be explained by
the stronginflows from abroad and bythe use ofan inner-intervention
band. Although the capital inflows could have been dealt with by hm
iting the appreciation ofthe exchange rate and allowing a decline in
nominal interest rates, nominal interest rates remained relatively
high. Thus, the tendency towards a fixed ER continued in practice in
spite ofthe widening ofthe band.
Am obvious motivation for the inner-intervention band was the
preference for the disinflation target and the expectation of strong
inflows of capital as a result of NAFTA approval. In retrospect, one
may argue that the progress on disinflation was made at the expense
ofgreater recessionarypressures in 1993. We may also speculate that
the preference for a low infiation and stable currency policy was
related to the motivation of minimizing the foreign investors’ uncer
tainties in a year loaded with political and economic uncertainties
associated with the election year and the ratification of the NAFTA
agreement. This interpretation was confirmed in late 1993 when
NAFTA was approved by the US Congress, President Carlos Salinas
de Gortari announced the presidential candidate, and the central
bank abandoned the inner-intervention band. The abandoning ofthe
inner-intervention band lcd to greater exchange rate fluctuations
within the wider band in response to the new sources ofuncertainty
that developed, such as the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio in
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Figure 1. Mexico’s Exchange Rate Band
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jump in the ER following the speculative attack in November of 1993
and again in February 1994. This regime may have an advantage over
a conventional fixed ER if the shocks are sufficiently large; but it is
still a fixed ER regime from the point of view of disinflation. The im
portant question iii early 1994, was whether the time had arrived for
the implementation ofa more flexible regime atthe currentstate ofthe
disinflation process.
Shifting Nominal Anchors
According to the view described earlier, inflation m stage two comes
down gradually as a result ofpersistence with the right fiscal policies
and reforms without any need to drag it down by tighter ER policy.
An attempt to force inflation down by fixing the ER will result in real
appreciation and thus recession but will have little effect on longer
term inflationary expectations since the public knows that such an ER
policy is costly and ultimately may be nonviable.
There was a case, however, formodifyingthe ER policy and gradu
ally shifting to an inflation target as the nominal anchor. To this end,
the authorities could have let the band crawl at the differential be
tweenthe expected domestic and international annualrate ofinflation
when the latter was unforced by ER policy. In this framework, as will
be explained in Section B, the expected domestic inflation rate
would be thecentral bank’s main monetary policytarget. The objective
of modiIying the ER policy in this way would have been to gradually
shift from using the nominal exchange rate as the nominal anchor to
using the monetary policy as the nominal anchor. This should have
the additional advantage oflimiting the real appreciation ofthe real
exchange rate.
March 1994, and the increase in U.S. short term interest rates
starting in February 1994.
The rationale for widening the ER band through the acceleration
of the crawl of the ceiling (reaffirmed in the September 1994 social
pact), was viewed as laying out the foundation for a more flexible ER
regime in the future. It could also have been regarded as the creation
of a cushion for handling shocks without violating the basic commit
ment to the ERrule. This interpretation is suggested bythe temporary
The Role ofWage Policy during the Transition
The inflationary regime is characterized by attempts to erode, or to
control, real wages by devaluations, and by preemptive wage hikes by
labor unions. Po avoid this spiral, it is common to find in many stabi
lization programs an effort to reach a social pact which restrains the
government and the unions in their one-sided policies. We can view
the pacts in the Israeli and Mexican stabiization in this light. The
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price controis (and the business sector) enter into the picture because
labor cannot risk a freeze of wages when the employers are free to
continue raising prices in the inflationary tradition (say because
oflack of credibility in the program); this fear may bejustified since
in the short run nominal wages and the ER are not sufficient to anchor
prices.
As the disinflation program gains more credibility, prices can be
liberalized but labor will still require the assurance of an ER anchor
inordertorestrainwage demands andadjustthestructureofcontracts
(forexample,themdexationclause)toanon-inflationaryenvironment.
We noted earlier that when the public becomes more convinced of the
government’s commitment to price stability the significance of an ac
tive nominal anchor, forthepurpose ofdisiaflation, diminishes.There
fore, the need for coordinationbetweenthe government’s ER policy and
the unions’wage objectives is reduced considerably. Given that efforts
to secure coordination with labor limits the flexibility ofthe ER policy
(and involve usually a fiscal cost) it is advisable, as a longer term
policy to bosen the coordination in these areas. Indeed, this has been
the process in Israel and iii Mexico since October 1993, when policy
makers started emphasizing bilateral wage negotiations between
workers and ernployers, and using productivity growth and futurein
flation to adjust minimum nominal wages.
But aslongasinflation doesnot come downtointernationallevels
there is a danger that nominal wage increases can get out of une.
Therefore, in the transition to an inflation target as a nominal anchor
sorne agreernent with laborthat the nature ofwage contracts is essen
tial to rule out serious cost pushes. Labor unions need an assurance
that the price level will not deviate frorn its normal position and not
lead to an erosion of real wages. At the current level of credibility in
disinflation, the present exchange rate band, or sorne close variant of
it, provides a reasonable assurance. Therefore, the coordination ofex
change rate and wage policy through the Pacto is still necessary. As
the confidence in price stability increases further, the workers will be
convincedofthegovernment’s cornmitmenttoprice stabilityevenwith
out anyannouncementofan exchangerateband. This isthetimewhen
the formal connection between exchange rate policy and wage con
tracts should be discontinued, as far as governrnent intervention is
concerned.
B. Shifting to an Inflajion Target
In this section we explain how Mexico could have used the inflation
target as the monetary framework to anchor prices and to consolidate
the lowinflation success; in particular, we explain how to reconcile the
greater exchange rate flexibiity with the objective of low inflation.
Since our objective is to explain how the inflation target framework
works, we combine sorne ofthe policiesundertaken by Mexico with the
experience of other developed countries. First, we discuss the role of
the independent central bank and second, the role ofmonetary policy.
The Role ofthe Independent Central Bank
Like in Canada, New Zealand and in other developed countries, in
Mexico on January 1, 1994, the Mexican Parliament enacted the Cen
tral Bank Law giving the central bank fuli independence and rnaking
price stability its key mandate. 9 Phis clear-cut mandate cornpels the
centralbanktoconcentrateitsefforts andresourcesinthefightagainst
inflation. The clear mandate makes the central bank accountable
forinflation performance. Thekeytask ofthe newindependent central
bank was to translate the price stability mandate into actual progress
in the flght against inflation. To reassure market participants that
shiftingnominal anchors will not leadto higherinflation, the objective
of the independent central bank was to consolidate the low inflation
success. In this regard there are important lessons to be learned frorn
other rnodern central banks.
A key task of the new independent central bank is to gain the
credibility ofmarketparticipants. Because inflation performance re
sponds to subjective factors such as market participants’expectations
as much as to objective factors such as economic fundamentals, be
coming a credible institution in the flght against inflation is a crucial
taskforthe centralbank. Fuli credibility would be attained whenmar
ket participants use the central bank inflation targets in forming ex
pectations offuture prices, thus making the central bank’s monetary
policy the true nominal anchor ofthe system.
To enhance its credibility, the central bank objectives should be
208
9 See Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1993) and Banco de México (1994a).
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a) to set attainable infiation targets, b) to become the watchdogin the
fight against inflation, and to ensure support ofthe government.
Setting Attainable Inflation Targets
The key objective in setting long-term inflation targets is to prove to
the marketthat the central bank is committed to these targets. Credi
bility will be gained gradually as the central bank shows the market
that it is meeting these targets. This commitment demands great re
sponsibility in determining the inflation targets. A key objective in
proving the central bank’s commitment to inflation targets is to en
courage marketparticipantstousetheinflationforecastsofthecentral
bank to form price expectations. By accomplishing this objective the
central bank would, in fact, make monetary policy the true nominal
anchor.
Setting inflation targets that are unattainable mightjeopardize
the central bank’ s fight against inflation in several ways. First, it
couldlead to greateruncertainty and speculationin the financialmar
kets. A high level ofuncertainty would, in turn, lead market partici
pants to expect higher inflation than that announced by the central
bank and thus prevent the central bank from meeting its target. Sec
ond, it could lead to tighter monetary policy in an effort by the central
bank to signal its commitment to the announced targets. Since this
could lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, to high real
interest rates, and possibly to an economic recession, the central bank
could attract great criticism from the public, thus eroding its support
in the fight against inflation.
Because of Mexico’s success in bringing down inflation in 1994,
there was no need to try to force a sharp fall in the inflation rate by
being commited to overoptimistic inflation targets. The inflation rate
was coming down as a result of the recent economic policies and, in
particular, as a result oftight fiscal policy. The objective ofthe govern
mentandthe centralbank is to ensurethattheinflationratecontinues
to fall by showing market participants their commitment to the tight
fiscal policy. In this regard the role of the central bank would be to
set realisticinflationtargets and to gain credibilityin thefight against
inflation.
Becoming the Watchdogij the Fight Against Inflation
The central bank should perform the watchdog role because while it
has the price stability mandate, by itselfthe central bank cannot con
trol inflation. To fulfill the price stability mandate the central bank
needs the support ofthe rest ofthe public sector. The central bank can
perform this role by exercising its independence and by gatheringin
formation regarding inflation developments. Compared to other mar
ket participants, the central bank has an advantage in gathering and
in processing information regarding inflation performance. Moreover,
through statistical analysisit is able to identify factors outside central
bank control that might undermine the fight against infiation.
The central bank can perform the watchdog role and gain market
participants’ trust by exercising its independence and promptly in
forming the market of developments that might lead to inflationary
pressures. Inflationary pressures could result from domestic expendi
ture shocks such as unfounded expectations ofan increase in perma
nent income that might lead to a consumption or investment boom.
Moreimportantly, inflationarypressures couldresult fromuriforeseen
changes in public sector finances that lead to a higher public sector
deficit. The central bank should announce these developments with
the aim ofgetting public support for adopting corrective economic and
fiscal measures which are outside its control.
Ensuring the Support ofthe Government
Controlling inflation is a complex task and one that cannot rely exclu
sively upon the central bank. Unfortunately, the central bank has direct
control only ofmonetary policy, which can only affect the inflationrate
in the long term. Experience indicatesthatthere are long and uncertain
lags in the response ofinflation to monetary policy.’° To be effective,
the central bank needs the support of the government and therefore
itis necessarythatmarketparticipants realizethat governmentsupport
is permanent. In particular, the central bank requires the support of
fiscal policy in the fight against infiation and the commitment ofthe
government to a tight fiscal policy. In addition, it requires support in
‘° See Duguay and Poloz ( 1990).
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terms ofsettingpublicutilityprices andincreases inindirecttaxrates,
since these could leadthe centralbank to fail to meetinfiationtargets.
One possible way to signal this support to the market is for the central
bank and the Treasury to jointly announce inflation targets. This
should signal the government’s willingness to support the central
bank’s monetary policy with consistent fiscal policies in the fight
against infiation. The joint announcement, for instance, couid take
place annually when the government announces the renewal of the
social pact and the exchange rate band pararneters.
The Role ofMonetary Policy
To guide both the design of policy and the expectations of market
participants iii the process of shifting nominal anchors, a clear and
transparent definition ofrnonetary policy’s objectives and strategy is
therefore needed. This section outlines a set of basic principies for
anchoring prices using monetary policy. It raises issues such as the
choice of goals, intermediate targets, indicators, and instruments of
monetary policy. Theframework discussed in this sectionblendsbasic
eiements ofcurrent monetary policy as followed by the central banks
of Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. We will
attempthere to draw on usefullessonsfromthese experiencesto apply
them to countries like Mexicothat are in the process ofshiftingnomi
nal anchors.
The Inflation Targets Framework
A broadly known conceptual framework for the design of monetary
policy rnakes a distinction between goals, intermediate targets, mdi
cators, and instruments. Thegoals ofmonetary policyare the ultimate
objectives ofsuch policy and they can be regarded as long-term objec
tives. Leading examples are price stability and fuil employment. It is
typically the case that the central bank has little direct control over
the variables identified as goals ofmonetary policy. In fact, there are
long and uncertain lags in the response ofthese variables to changes
inmonetary policy. Moreover, there aresubstantial delays in obtaining
1
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reliabie information abojit the path of these variables. Thus, in real
time centralbank staffhave no other choice butto rely on assessments
ofthe underlying trends and developments in the variables that serve
as ultimate objectives of policy.
Next are the intermediate targets of monetary policy which can
be regarded as short-term objectives. These could be useful in achiev
ing the ultimate objectives because the variables that are commonly
chosen to be intermediate targets are more controilabie and morefre
quentlyobservedthanthe goals, andtheyarecorrelatedwiththegoals.
The specifics ofintermediatetargets could be formally announced, say
once every six months, or they could be treated as informal guidelines
withinthe centralbank. Sornecentralbanks usemonetaryaggregates,
exchange rates, and nominal income as formal or informal intermedi
ate targets. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, or when an exchange
rate band operates, the exchangerate becomes an intermediate target
ofmonetary poiicy.
Indicators, or information variables, are variables that provide
the centralbankwithinformation aboutthe stance ofmonetary policy
and the state of the economy. When new information arrives in the
form ofindicators, it usually leads to a reassessment ofthe extent to
which monetary policy has to be changed to ensure the achievement
ofits ultimate objectives. Depending on the specifics ofthe monetary
policy framework, a variable may be an intermediate target or an
indicator. Leading examples of indicators are the siope of the yield
curve, the governmentbudget deficit, forwardforeign exchangerates,
the output gap, foreign exchange reserves, the level ofcredit, wages,
and measures of inflation expectations. When fixed, the exchange
rate is an intermediate target; yet when floating it could serve as an
indicator.
Last, instruments are those variables under the direct control of
the central bank that are used to implement monetary policy. While
most central banks use short-term interest rates as their instrument,
such as the interest rate at which they lend cash to private banks
others employ the monetary base (or a cornponent ofthe base such as
nonborrowed reserves) as their instrument. Once a variable is chosen
as the instrument for monetary policy, it is important to specify the
rules that will guide the day-to-day adjustments in this variable iii
response to changing conditions. One such rule, which is commonly
observed, is that the central bank raises short-term interest rates
(andlor reduces the rate ofgrowth ofthe monetary base) when there
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ja sufficient evidence that the rate ofinflation is tending to exceed the
rate specified as an ultimate objective. 1 ’
Making the Framework Operational to Mexico
This sectionmakesthemonetarypolicyframeworkoperationaltoMex
ico in early 1994. First we explain the role ofexplicit inflation targets;
and second, we explain the role ofintermediate targets and indicators
ExplicitInflation Targets. More and more central banks have selected
price stability as their ultimate objective. Research and accumulated
experience indicate that monetary policy has a systematic impact on
nominal variables such as the price level. Preserving the value of
money ja certainly withm the scope of monetary action and it is the
bestcontribution, from a medium orlong-term perspective,thatmofle
tary policy can bring about economic growth and we]fare. There is no
clear evidence that explicit price-stability goals alone have resulted m
lower rates ofgrowth or higher rates ofunemployment. And the post
war experience in various countries suggests that an explicit fuil em
ployment goal formonetary policymaylead to a high and variablerate
ofinfiation, without ensuring the achievement ofsuch goal.
To be effective, a price-stability goalhas to be defined in a precise
and transparent manner. Precision and transparencycan increasethe
credibiity ofmonetary policy and can strengthen its impact on infla
tion expectations. They also make it possible to assess inreal timethe
extent to which the current conduct of monetary policy ja consistent
with achievement ofthe specified goal.
In the Mexican context (as in Chile or Israel), there is still a long
way to go te achieve price stability perse. 12 Hence, a low inflation goal
11 In using short term interest rates to bring down inflation, central banks presume that
short term interest rates have a direet effect on aggregate nominal dernand. However, under
certain conditions, for example, when the increase in short-term interest rates have a direct
effect on aggregate supply andrnonopolistic conditions prevail, anincrease inintereatratescould
signal an increase in the expected inflation rate.
12 There is however sorne discussion ofwhat the price stability objective really means. Sorne
have argued against making a zero rate inflation the price stability goal since it might be unde
sirable to eliminate inflation altogether oc economic efficiency grounds; and moreover it inight
be desirable to have sorne inflation and negative real interest ratas for short-terrn and riskless
securities, see Summers ( 1991). The Bank ofCanada, forinstance, has defined the pricestabiity
goal as a 2 percent rate ofinflation.
can play the same roletht price stability plays as the ultimate policy
objective in industrial countries. The specification and announcement
ofexplicit inflation targets have proven to be a useful and meaningful
way for the central bank to make its cornmitment precise and trans
parent. This route for monetary policy was formally chosen by several
countries such as Britain, Canada, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, and
Sweden.’ 3 The experience ofthese countries illustrates that inflation
targets can be extremely effective in the process ofdisinflation, espe
cially by providing an anchor to inflation expectations precisely at
a time when the role ofthe exchange rate as an anchor is diminished.
Inflation targets could be based on the consumer price index or any
other well-kriown price index. They can be specffled as a given figure
(say, 5 percent inflation) or as a range (say, inflation rates between
4 and 7 percent). Moreover, the time horizons could vary Sorne central
banks announce inflation targets for the next few years; others limit
their target to the current or next year.
The mere announcement ofaninflation target doesnotguarantee
a low inflation outcome. Ultimately, whether or not explicit inflation
targets contribute to the achievement ofthe ultimate goal ofrnonetary
policy depends on the extent to which the central bank is allowed, and
is willing, to adjust its instruments so as to ensure that the goal is
met, in spite ofmajor political and interest group pressures. Another
factoriswhether or not the centralbank Board ofGovernors andman
agernent are accountable ifthe goal ja not met. These are the factors
that will determine the degree of credibiity ofthe inflation target in
the eyes of the public. When an inflation target was first announced
in Israel for 1992, it was not regarded as highly credible. However,
credibility was gained after sorne time and after the actions by the
authorities made transparent their commitment to the target. Nowa
days, most financial managers in the private sector use the official
inflation target as their own forecast ofinflation.
Although the Mexican authorities announced inflation targets in
recent years, the targets were more a form ofprice-increaseguidelines
in the context ofthePacto, than the rnain operationalgoal ofrnonetary
policy. The target inflation was 9.7 percent for 1992; inflation ended
up higherthan this target forthe year, i.e., 11.9 percent. For 1993, the
authorities announced a targetrate ofinfiation of 7 percent and actual
13 5ee Freedman (1993) oc the case ofCanada, and Crockett (1993) on the United Kingdom.
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inflation ended up bemg 8 percent; and for 1994 the authorities an
nounced a target of4 percent and actual infiation was 7 percent. De
spite the minordeviation fromtarget, the achievementofa single-digit
rate ofinflation after a longtime was regarded as a remarkable event.
The inflation target for 1995 has been set at 42 percent quite an am
bitious figure.’ 4
In our view, it is important to make the inflation target the key
element in the design of monetary policy and nominal macro policy.
Such a target should refiect the consensus, and commitment, of the
Treasury and the central bank, and should be openly aimounced at
thetimeofrenewalofthePacto, oratthetime ofsubmittingtheBudget
to Congress. In implementing the inflation target it would be well to
follow the next basic rules:
• To specify the target in the form of a range of inflation rates
—say between 4 and 7 percent— rather than as a fixed single
figure.’ 5 The specific range that is chosen should be consistent
with the behavior offundamentais, including external varia
bles. In an open economy such as Mexico, there are various
internal and external forces affectinginflationwhose path may
be difficultto assessinrealtime. Hence,itwouldbeappropriate
to mcorporate this uncertaintyinto the formulation ofthe target;
• To provide the public with a clear statement of the predicted
multi-year path for the target. For instance, this could be of
the form: “the goal is for the rate ofinflation in Mexico to con
verge to the rates ofinflation ofindustrial countries —in par
ticular in the U.S. and Canada— within the next 2-3 years”;
• To make it clear and transparent that the principal concern of
the monetary authority (with the cooperation ofthe Treasury)
is to ensurethat the inflation target is met, and, therefore, that
monetary policy will be adjusted whenever various indicators
point to a tendency for deviation ofactual (or expected future)
inflation from target. Policy transparency can be enhanced by
a central bank decision to publish a quarterlyInflation Report
(as in the case ofthe Bank ofEngland) or a semiannual report
14 See the March 1995 economic program.
15 For example, the inflation target in the United Kingdom has been set at the range of 1 to
4 percent per year for the remainder ofthe present Parliament (i.e., probably until about 1996
or 1997), withthe explicit intention to bring inflationintothe lowerhalfofthe range bythe latter
part ofthis period.
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(as in the case of t.he Federal Reserve Board ofthe U.S.), pro
viding analysis of how the various factors in the econorny are
combining to result in the observed (and predicted)path forthe
rate ofinflation. This publication would also provide sorne ex
ternal discipline, in that the authorities would have to account
for their actions in explicit relation to the extent to which they
assesstheirultimateobjectiveisbeingmetundertheprevailing
conditions.
Intermediate Targets andIndicators. An idealintermediate target has
a high correlation with the ultimate objective of monetary policy but
is much easier to control. Yet, the problem is that it is difficult to find
such an ideal intermediate target. In Mexico, the monetary base has
been used as the intermediatetarget.’ 6 Itis claimedthat the monetary
base has a reasonable stable relation with the price level. Moreover,
the central bank can effectively change the rnonetary base via open
marketoperations,whichisaflexibleandefficientinstrumentofmone
tary policy. The centralbank can also affectthebaseindirectlythrough
primary auctions of government paper. The operating rule has been
that the monetary base is changed only in response to changes in the
demand for the base. The latter is assurned to depend on expected
inflation, economic activity, and seasonal factors. The rule impliesthat
rnovementsininternationalreserves are sterilized,unlesstheyappear
to imply a shift in the monetary base in the same direction as the
change in the demand for the base.
The use of monetary aggregates, such as the monetary base, as
intermediatetargetshas well-known limitations.Firstit can be shown
that ifmoney demand shocks (or financial disturbances) are the domi
nant force in the economy (as opposed to shocks to investment or con
sumption),thentheuse ofthemonetarybase asanintermediatetarget
can result in much higher volatility ofoutput and interest rates than
otherwise (see Poole, 1970). This argument appears to be especially
relevant inthe present decade ofthe 1990s, when there have been and
are expected to continue to be substantial financial shocks and major
portfolioadjustmentsinMexico.Second, thisprocedurerequires stable
empirical estirnates of demand for the base and good forecasts of
velocity.
‘ 6 ’llie statements were based on our discussions with the central bank economic research
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Empirical failures on both these counts in the 1970s and 1980s,
underthe influence offlnancial innovation and liberalization, ledvan
ous central banks to downgrade the importance of monetary targets
as the basis for policy. 17 Third, the procedure does not make use of
superior information by the central bank regarding the disinflation
process. Erroneous expectations by the public, and lack ofcredibility
about disinflation, may result in high nominal interest rates, which
may turn out to be excessively high real interest rates to the extent
that disinflation is indeed effected.
While the use ofthe monetary base as an intermediate target of
monetary policy has resulted in satisfactory monetary and financial
performancein Mexico in recentyears, ex-post realinterestrateshave
been relatively high. Moreover, the procedure was based on stable es
timates ofvelocity and demand forthe base, and there is noguarantee
that such stability will hoid under the financial innovations, liberali
zation, and international diversification ofportfolios expected for the
comingyears. And financial shocks (e.g., shocks to capital inflows) are
likely to play an increasingly dominant role in the Mexican economy.
Accordingly, the foregoing discussion would suggest that one
should consider shiftingtothe alternative procedure ofhavingashort
terminterestrate as the operationaltarget formonetary policy, which
could be particularly useful when used with monetary aggregates as
intermediate targets.’ 8 The main distinctionbetween an intermediate
and operational target is twofold. First is the effect ofthe instrument
on the target. In the case of an operational target the effect of an
instrumentismuch quickerand directthan on anintermediatetarget.
For instance, the effects of monetary policy instruments (changes in
monetary base or central bank discount rate) on interest rates are
almost immediate, while the effects on monetary aggregates tend to
be spread out over a longer period. Second is the ability to measure
monetary policy stance. The intermediate target is usually a nominal
17 See Crockett (1993) for discussion and evidence that the relation between intermediate
targets and ultimate objectives, as well as forecasts ofvelocity, becaine more variableinthe 1970s
and 1980s. As a result ofthis, many countries reduced the emphasis on monetary aggregates:
Canada in 1982, Spain in 1991, and the U.K. in 1986. The United Statea redefinedmoneygrowth
targets as monitoring ranges in 1993, and even the Bundesbank has shown discretion with
iniplementing its own (announced) monetary targets.
15 This has been the case in Canada. Other central banks in industrial countries have em
ployed interestrates as operationaltargets, see, e.g., Bernanke and Mishkin (1992) and Kasman
(1992). More detailed information on Canada is provided by Duguay and Poloz (1990), and on
the United Kingdom by Crockett (1993).
variable that can be usecj. as a nominal anchor to the system, while
the operational target, such as the short-term interest rates, cannot
serve as an anchor.
Theuseofshort-terminterestrates as an operationaltarget could
work as follows. Based on a reasonable estimate for the real interest
rate plus a risk premium plus the inflation target range announced
by the authorities, the central bank could determine the desired level
for the short-term nominal interest rate. Open market operations
would thenbe conductedtoensurethatthemarketinterestrateis close
to thetarget; i.e., the monetarybase nowbecomes an endogenousvari
able. Ifthe central bank and the Treasury have superior information
indicating that the reduction in inflation is larger than what was ex
pected by the public, the central bank intervention can increase the
monetary base up to the point where the implied lower interest rate
is a market outcome. These considerations are especiafly relevant for
1996, when the inflation target is 20 percent, well below previous in
flation targets and performance. Under these circumstances, a 29 to
33 percent range for the short-term interest rate would seem to be a
reasonable intermediate target for monetary policy (based on 18 to 22
percent inflation target range plus a 7 percent real interest rate plus
a 4 percent nisk premium).’ 9
However, using short-term interest rates as a target has impor
tant shortcomings. In countries like Mexico exposed to a substantial
amount ofcapital inflows from abroad the nominalinterestrate might
deviate from its covered interest rate position because it usually re
sponds to supply and demand for capital inflows. Therefore, targeting
the short term interest rate for disinflation objectives might lead to
a shortage or to an excess ofcapital inflows.
In any case, ifthe short-term nominal interest rate is chosen as
an operational target, it is for the central bank to decide whether or
not the target interest rate level will be formally announced or not. In
the case of Israel, there is a monthly announcement about the area
within which the central bank plans to target interestrates, but there
is no formal orimplied commitmentthat ex-postinterestrates will fall
in that area.
Underthe proposed regime, it should be well understood that the
main indicator to which the monetary policy instrument responds is
19 These estimates are based on the authorities inflation objective and international evi
dence.
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the projected level of inflation, say 12 months ahead. When various
indicators ofinflationary trends suggest a danger ofinflation exceed
ingthe announcedtarget, it would be appropriate to tighten monetary
conditions by raising interest rates or reducing the rate ofgrowth of
the monetary base. Accordingly, substantial attention would be given
to monitoringandinterpretingindicators ofinflation such asthe siope
of the yield curve, the output gap, survey and market-based meas
ures of inflation expectations, the behavior of wages, the position of
the exchange rate within the band, and so on.
In an open economy such as Mexico, the exchange rate is likely to
be an important intermediate target or indicator for monetary policy.
Infact,there is a closelinkbetween exchange rate policy andmonetary
policy: a free float provides the national monetary authorities with a
great deal of room for autonomous policies, yet no such monetary
autonomy can exist under a fixed exchange rate. Under the circum
stances in Mexico, the exchange rate band regime is likely to be main
tained in the near future at least as long as there is a convergence
process toward inflation rates as in the United States. However, it is
plausible to consider allowing more room for exchange rate flexibility
by both widening the band and reducing the extent ofintramarginal
intervention. Increased flexibility may well be needed to deal with the
changing nature of capital inflows and the large size ofinternal and
externalfinancialdisturbances.Asindicated, suchincreasedflexibility
will offerthe central bank more autonomy overthe stance ofmonetary
policy. 2 °
In addition to the exchange rate, it is likely that the Mexican
authorities will closely monitor the behavior ofinternational reserves
and capital inflows, which could be defined as either indicators or
additional intermediate targets. If so, it should be recognized that it
will be difficult to simultaneously meet ah intermediate targets at ah
times. That is, there could be episodes in which a policy dilemma (or
conflict) arises between various intermediate targets, such as interest
ratesandexchangerates (orreserves). Putdifferently, commonlythere
are not enough degrees offreedom for policy to achieve simultaneously
both the ultimate goal and all of the intermediate targets. In these
20 indication ofrecognition by the authorities ofthe useful role that could be played
by exchangerate flexibilitywithin the band in dealingwith shocks is provided by recent episodes
ofstrong demand forUS dollars,in November 1993 and Februaryand March 1994. The exchange
rate was allowed to reach the upper limit ofthe band in both these cases.
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circumstances,itis for t4ie centralbank to decidewhichvariablesreact
first and which last to the disturbances.
To ihlustrate this potential dilemma, consider the central bank
response to a sudden capital outflow in 1994. There were atleastthree
reasonable policy reactions by the central bank in this case:
• to let the exchange rate depreciate within the band, with no
change in official reserves or the short-term interest rate;
• to sell foreign exchange to the public, and to maintain the ex
change rate and the short-term interest rate at their previous
leveis; and
• to raise the short-term interest rate to defend both the band
and official reserves.
Apriori, there is no clear-cut guide for choosing amongthese pohi
cies. The optimal choice by the authorities depends on the relative
importance ofthe various intermediate targets and indicators in pol
icy-maker preferences. It also depends on whether the shock is per
ceived as transitory or permanent, and on whether it comprises the
ultimate iriflation target. In Israel, the second option is the one that
would be chosen by the central bank had there been a perception
that the shock is transitory In Chile, in contrast, sorne combinatjon
ofthe first and the third options would most likely have been chosen.
The experience ofMexicountil mid-1994 indicated a deep concern
with reducing inflation and, at the same time, attracting capital in
fiows and building up international reserves. This has probably over
burdened monetarypolicy, which had no choice but to provide interest
rates high enough to meet these goals (along the lines of the third
option aboye). However,things couldchange inthenearfuture as fiscal
discipline becomes the norm and as there is increased determination
to allow for increased flexibihity of the exchange rate. Under these
conditions, a combination ofthe first and second options would repre
sent a reasonable centralbank reaction to sudden and transitorycapi
tal outfiows rather than the alternative ofrelying on the third option.
The latter could be kept for those cases in which the capital outflow is
perceived to be morepermanent andlor there ja a need to defend the
exchange rate band and reserves against a strong (temporary) specu
lative attack.
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The Bottom Lme
The proposed policyframework places a strongemphasis on specifying
and announcingthe ultimate objective ofmonetary policy —the grad
ual reduction ofinflation and its convergence to the leveis prevailing
in Mexico’s main trading partners. The policy framework is based on
the standard transmission mechanism under limited exchange rate
flexibility, in which monetary policy operates through changes in in
terest rates (or the monetary base) and in foreign exchange market
intervention, and influencestherate ofinflationwith substantiallags.
Two key variables play the role ofintermediate targets or indicators
for monetary policy: a short-term interest rate (or the monetary base
growth rate) and the exchange rate. As far as the latter is concerned,
the suggestion is to continue having a crawling exchange rate band
whose width gradually expands with time. In addition, policy would
rely on continuous monitoring ofvarious financial and economic mdi
cators and on the signais they provide about the likelihood that the
ultimate objectives would be attained under the prevailing policy. The
framework is pragmatic and eclectic: it does not rely on strict reaction
functions (or rules) for the setting ofthe policy instrurnents. However,
it does rely on a strong andtransparent commitmentto an announced
inflation target. This means that policy instruments would have to be
adjusted when the arrival of new information points to serious risks
about the achievement ofthe ultimate objective.
Two marn sets ofarguments are likely to enter the central bank
reaction function: first, any projected discrepancies between actual
andtargetinflation, and, second, actualand expectedforeign exchange
rnarket pressure. Let us illustrate the proposed strategy for rnonetary
policy reaction to these arguments with two realistic examples. First,
consider a case when new information indicates that nominal aggre
gate demand is running aboye the projected level. Otherthings equal,
this would imply that if policy is not adjusted, the goal of policy (i.e.,
the inflation target) would not be achieved as originally planned. In
order to be consistent with the ultimate objectives, monetary policy
would have to be tightened. Accordingly, the central bank can be ex
pected to initiate an upward adjustment in interest rates (or a down
ward adjustment in monetary base growth). Second, consider a tran
sitory rise in interest rates in the U.S. which gives rise to a sudden
capitaloutflowand toforeignexchange marketpressuretowardamore
depreciated exchange rate and/or lower official reserves. Ifunderlying
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fundamentais are unchwngecl, the central bank could meet this shock
by sorne foreign exchange market intervention and sorne depreciation
of the exchange rate within the band. When necessar for example,
during a speculative attack, these measures could be reinforced by a
rise in interest rates.
As indicated, it is difficult to formalize the foregoing reactions in
simple and strict rules. Given the changingnature ofthetransmission
mechanism of monetary policy in the l990s, it is well for the central
bank to exercise sornejudgment, and a process ofsuccessive approxi
mations, in settingand adjustingmonetary policyinstruments. Atthe
same time, it is recommended that the policymaker reveal to market
participants the considerations taken into account in formulating
monetary policy.
C. International Experience
Inthis section wereviewthe experience ofothercentralbanks interms
of central bank independence and ofthe monetary policy framework
used. This will ilustrate the problems that other central banks have
faced and possible ways to overcome thern. In addition, it helps to
compare the monetary policy framework suggested in Section B with
the experience ofother central banks. We organize the rest ofthe sec
tion as follows. First, we briefly review other central banks in terms
of accountability and monetary policy frameworks used; and second,
we focus on problems in implementingthe infiation targetfrarnework.
Accountability and the Monetary Policy Framework
Recently the role of central banks has experienced a change in two
major directions. First, governments granted central banks the clear
price stability mandate and made them fully accountable for the fight
against inflation. 2 1 Second, central banks have reconsidered their
monetary policy framework for controllmg inflation.
21 Although the new independent central banks usuafly have relied on the support offiscal
policy, sorne central banks have lacked supportive fiscal policy, jeopardizing the central bank
fight against inflation.
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The Central Bank Mandate and Accountabiity
Influenced by the successful experience ofthe Bundesbankin the fight
against inflation, most modern central bank legislation has given cen
tral banks a single mandate: price stability. This mandate should not
be interpreted as an end in itself; it is rather a means to an end, the
end being a sound economy with high leveis ofemployment and rising
standards of living. The 1970s experience with high inflation rates
and with central banks trying to attain fuli employment objectives
usingmonetary policy instruments led to a reconsideration ofthe cen
tral banks’ main objective. The high inflation rates of the 1970s led
governments to decide makingthe main objective ofcentralbanks the
fight againstinflation. Policy-makers soonrealizedthat monetarypol
icy could only affect the level of employment in the short term but
perhaps at the expense of higher iriflation in the future. Moreover,
empirical analysis onthe effects ofinflationindicatethat reducingthe
rate ofinflationwouldmakethe economymore efficientandproductive
and that high inflation rates impose a heavyburden on the economy. 22
Another important reason to make price stability the focus of
monetary policy was the experience ofcentral banks and the theoreti
cal developments in expectations formation. Before the 1980s, mofle
tarypolicy ofcentralbanks was assignedseveralobjectiveswhichmost
ofthetimewerein conflict, such aspricestabilityandfuli employment.
Because ofthis conflictin objectives centralbanks failed to meetthem.
Moreover, itwas impossibleto assesstheextentto which centralbanks
were infact aimingat theseobjectives; that is, there waslittleaccount
abiity. In the early 1980s this led to a reconsideration ofthe central
bank mandate.
Most ofthe newcentral bank Iegislations assign a singlemandate
to centralbanks and make Governors andBoardofGovernors account
able for meeting this mandate. This greater focus on one single man-
date was further reinforced by the theoretical research on expecta
tions and time consistency (e.g., Poole, 1970) which stressed the need
to make the focus ofmonetary policy the control ofinflation. Because
monetary policy can only influence the inflation rate in the mediurn
term, that is, price expectations cannot be changed over night, mone
tary policy needs consistency over time.
22 See Bruno and Easterly (1995) for recent and compellmg international evidence of the
adverse effects ofinflation on economic growth.
As a result, most central banks opted for similar mandates and
formakingthe centralbank accountableforthe fight againstinflation.
In Table 1 we summarize the experience ofsix modern central banks
in terms ofmandate and accountability. The adoption ofthe price sta
bility mandate by most of these central banks was influenced by the
Bundesbank’s success in fighting inflation. In the early l990s, the Re
serve Bank of New Zealand and the bank of Canada embraced price
stability as the single mandate and the results in terrns of inflation
have been apparent. The only exception is the US Federal Reserve
Board Systern that has several objectives ranging from price stability
to the attainment offull employment. However, on repeated occasions
in hearings before the US Congress, Chairman Greenspan has made
it clear that he would favor a single price stability mandate.
In general, in most central banks, responsibility and account
ability for the fight against inflation lies with the Governors and the
Boards ofGovernors; and most central bank legislations make special
provisions to grant independence to the Board of Governors from the
Minister of Finance or the Executive. However, legislation vanes
amongcountriesinthewayithasprovidedcentralbankindependence.
For instance, in countnies like the U.S. and Germany,, the Executive
branch can only appoint a minority ofthe members ofthe board and
the Governor and members ofthe Board are accountable only to Con
gress. In other countries such as Canada and New Zealand the Mm
ister of Finance appoints the Governor and the Board of Governors
but independence of the central bank Board is ensured by rnaking
special provisions for overniding the Governor. To this effect, the Mm
ister ofFinance has to submit to Parliarnent a detailed statement ex
plaining the reasons for the disagreement and the time during which
it would like to change the targets. (Until now these provisions have
not been used in either country.) The only central bank that has no
special provision for independence is the Bank of England since it is
not independent from the government. Responsibility for the fight
against inflation lies whith its Board but ultimately on the Chancellor
ofthe Exchequer.
An important provision for ensuring central bank accountability
istherequirementtosubmitfrequentreports toPanliamentexplaining
monetary policy objectives and performance in relation to monetary
policy targets. Although most central banks publish sorne basic infor
mation such as balance sheets, annual reports and financial state
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monetaryassessments toParliament. The centralbanks withthe most
clear mandate are the US Fed and the Reserve Bank ofNew Zealand.
Both the 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins Act in the U.S. and the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand Act require that the central bank publish and
submit to Congress semiannual reports. In the case of the U.S. the
Fed should submit a semíannual report assessing monetary policy
against the monetary aggregates targets, and explain the monetary
policy objectives, and the Fed’s expectations about the performance of
the economy. TheReserveBank ofNewZealandmustsubmitmonetary
policy statements reviewing the implementation of monetary policy
over the period since the last statement and detail the policies and
means by which monetary policy will be directed in the future. Al
though in the other three countries there are no formal requirements,
they keep the public informed oftheirmain monetary policy objectives
and it is fair to say that they are converging to the semiannual report
system of the U.S. and New Zealand. To gain public support for its
policies the Bundesbank pursues an active and open information pol
icy; the Bank of Canada submits special reports to the Minister of
Finance on monetary policy objectives and performance, and in the
future the government is planning to amend the Bank ofCanada Act
to formally require the Bank to publish and submit to Congress semi
annual monetary policy reports; and the Bank ofEngland to gain sup
port for its monetary policy publishes the so-called “inflation reports”.
The Monetary Policy Framework
Another important change in central banks has been in the monetary
policy framework. Until the late 1970s, most central banks announced
targetranges for nominal monetary aggregates, based onthe assump
tion ofstable demand formoneyfunctions. However, in theearly 1980s
most ofthese demands for money functions broke down in the face of
financial innovations, deregulation and shifts in asset-holders’portfo
lios. Money demand functions based on monetary aggregates were no
longer useful for forecasting nominal output although in most cases
they were used in the context of a greater econometric model. There
fore, it became difficult to assert how much ofthe changes inmonetary
aggregates resulted from endogenous factors such as changes in nomi
nalincome andinterestrates, andhowmuch to exogenousfactors such
as financial innovations or exogenous shocks. This led most central
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banks either to abandon the use oftarget ranges for monetary aggre
gates, or to limit their importance in determining monetary policy
stance, or both.
Although most countriesreporteciinTable 1 wentthrough similar
experiences,theyadopted differentprocedures toimplementmonetary
policy. In the U.S. the 1978 Humphrey-Hawljns Act requires the Fed
to publish target ranges for monetary aggregates and to evaluate its
monetary policy against these targets. The Fed used these targets on
Ml for monetary policy until 1981 when most of the money demand
functions broke down as a result ofhigh inflation, financial innovation
and shifts in the portfolios of asset-holders; since then the Fed has
used short-term interest rates as an operational target. Based on ob
servations of federal funds rates, the interest yield curve, and other
information on nominal income, the Fed determines the ranges of
nominal interest rates consistent with its inflation forecasts.
The Bundesbank had a very similar experience. There is evi
dence that the Bundesbank is placing greater discretion on imple
mentingits monetarytargets andisrelyingmoreheavily on shortterm
interest rates as operational targets.
The Banks of Canada, England, and New Zealand, which had a
similar experience, adopted a bolder alternative: inflation targets. In
the early l980s the three central banks stopped relying on monetary
aggregates as intermediatetargets. Althoughthesecentral bankscon
tinue producingtargetranges formonetary aggregates, they use these
targets as inforrnational variables and only publish target ranges for
annual consumer price inflation. To understand better how to make
the inflation target framework operational, in the rest ofthis section
we will review the experiences ofthe Bank ofCanada and the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand.23 Both central banks use annual iriflation as
targets for monetary policy ánd publish themjointly with the govern
ment.
En the case of Canada the government announces the inflation
targets annually at the time ofsubmittingthe budget to Congress, and
at the same time the Bank ofCanada issues a press release providing
the details on the inflation targets. In the case of New Zealand the
inflation targets are announced in the policy targets agreements (FrA)
thataresigned byboththe government andthe Governor ofthe central
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bank. The Bank of Canada decided to make the first guidepost ofin
flation 22 months after the announcement, and to simultaneouslyan
nounce the long-term path for inflation. It arinounced the inflation
target ranges for 1992 to 1995 which would lead to price stability.
Fixingthe first guidepost 22 rnonths afterthe announcement wasjus
tified by the long lags with which rnonetary policy affects inflation.
The Bank ofCanada estimatesthat thesevary between four and eight
quarters. The announcernent of the long-term path of inflation was
justified by the bank Canada as a signal to the market participants of
the central bank’s cornmitrnent and to enable firms and individuals to
adjust to these rates ofinflation.
As a result ofthe breakdown of the demand for money fiinctions,
both countries have been searching for alternative intermediate targets
that could stand somewhere between the ultimate goal, the inflation
target, and the central bank’s monetary policy instrurnents, the expan
sion ofbase money or discount rates. Since the mid-1980s when the in
termediatetargetawereabandoned,bothcentralbanksresortedtoshort
term interest rates as operational targets and used monetary targets as
informational variables. Although usmg short term interest rates as an
operationaltargetallowsthecentralbanktoassessthe effectofmonetary
policy relatively quickly, interest rates are not a nominal variable and
thus the central bank cannot use them as nominal anchors. This is the
role ofintermediate targets such as monetary aggregates.
To substitute for the intermediate targets the Bank ofCanada is
using two alternative procedures to determine the rnonetary stance.
First, using econorny-wide medium and short-term econornetric mod
els the Bank staff translates the target ranges for annual inflation
into forecasts ranges for rnonetary aggregates (Ml and M2), the ex
change rate level and short-term interest rates. Usingthese forecasts
the Bank staff anticipate shifts in output and prices, which are then
used to rnake adjustments to the monetary policy stance. The proce
dure is as follows. Using these econometric modeis the staff produce
forecasts for monet.ary aggregates, the exchange rate, and interest
rates for periods that vary from 6 to 7 quarters in the medium term
model, and 2 to 4quartersinthe short-term. Moreover,usingtheshort
term model and the most recent information, the Bank staffcan make
these forecasts once a week. By comparing the forecasts ranges
for these variables with the actual values, the Bank staffcan indicate
how much ofthe deviation results frorn shifts in real output and how
much frorn prices. Although it is common for sorne ofthe deviation in
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high frequency data to’Tesult from short term disturbances orinstitu
tional development, persistence in these deviations indicates shifts in
output or prices. It is argued in the case ofCanada, for instance, that
persistent deviations in Ml are a good leading indicator for shifts in
output, while the deviation in M2 are a leading indicator for shifts
in prices. Second, theBankofCanada uses amonetaryconditionsindex
(MCI) as an operational target which it regards as a more accurate
indicator ofrnonetary policy stance. The MCI is considered a more ac
curate operational target than short-term interest rates because:
a) monetary policy usually affects both interest rates and exchange
rates, and b) helps to determine to what degree ofexogenous shocks
that result in changes in exchange rates and in aggregate dernand
need to be offset through monetary policy. In other words, the MCI is
particularlyuseful to offset the overvaluation ofthe ERthat could take
place as a result of monetary shocks. The MCI is a weighted average
ofthe short-term interest rate and changes in the exchange rate and isestimatedrelativeto abaseyear. Theweightsindicatetheproportion
ofmonetary policychangesthat aretransiatedinto changes ininterest
rates and in the exchange rate, respectively. Using the econometric
modeis, the Bank forecasts operational target ranges for MCI that are
consistent with the inflation targets objective, and deviations ofactual
relative te the forecast ranges prompts changes in central bank mo
netary policy stance. The MCI in addition to being an important ope
rational target, enables the monetary authorities to offset through
monetary policy changes the effect of monetary policy shocks on the
nominal exchange rates and in aggregate nominal dernand.
Like rnost other operational targets used by central banks, the
MCI alsopresentsproblems. Two in particularshould be borneinmmd.
The first is that the MCI cannot substitute for a nominal variable and
cannot perform the role of a nominal anchor to the system. Central
banks can enhance the effectiveness ofmonetary policy by combining
the use of the MCI with other rnonetary aggregates as intermediate
targets. Because monetary policy is ultimately about how rnonetary
expansion affects nominal income, monetary authorities need a nomi
nal variable that serves as a measure of monetary policy and as a
nominal anchor to the system. The second is that changes in the MCI
do not always respond to changes in monetary policy conditions. This
problem argues againstthe rnechanistjc use ofthe MCIfordetermining
changes in monetary policy stance. On a day-to-day basis exchange
rates mightfluctuate in response te shortterm changes in speculators’
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expectations rather than to changes in price expectations. Moreover,
in sorne other cases long-term changes in the exchange rate are asso
ciated with terms oftrade or financial shocks, and others from a loss
of confidence in the local currency or political shocks. It is not clear
that these changes in exchange rates should prornpt a change in the
monetary policy stance with the objective of rneeting a desired MCI
target. In the case of loss of confidence or political shock the central
bankmightneedto encourage orvalidatetheincreaseininterestrates.
Problems in Implementing the Inflation Target Framework
The experience of countries that implemented the inflation targets
framework suggestthat there are sorne important questionsthat need
tobe answered in advance. 24 The answers to these questions, however,
are likely to depend onthe initial conditions prevailingin each country
The following are the rnost irnportant.
• Howfast should the decline ofthe target inflation be? This has
been extensivelydiscussedinthe economicliteratureandthere
are different views. Usually a gradual decline is argued based
ontheexistenceoflongterrncontracts, lagsinadjustmentbeha
vior, and lags in the adjustment of inflation to expectations.
However, it is possible to argue inthe opposite direction as well
based on the assumption that a rapid disinflation could break
entrenched expectations. Experience suggests that it is impor
tant to strike a balance between these two opposing views. But
as we argued in Section B, the pace should not undermine the
credibility ofthe central bank.
• What measure of inflation should be used? The central bank
can select among several indices and consider sorne refine
rnents to even out the wide fiuctuations as a result ofseasona
lities, that is, food prices. Experience suggests that it is prefe
rable to use the annual rate of change in the consumer price
index. First it is the price index most readily available; and
second it is the one rnost persons use. This will rnake the as
sessment ofcentral bank performance rnore transparent.
24 This sectionwas writtenbasedontheexperiences ofCanadaandNewZealand andliberally
borrows ideas contained in Freedman (1993 and 1994).
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• What should the response to large price shocks be? Cases of
major price shocks might justify changes in the entire target
path but this should be done in very unusual circumstances.
Exarnples could be the sudden increases in oil prices or price
increases resultingfrom major natural disasters. To avoid ero
sion in central bank credibility and cornmitment to inflation
reduction, central banks should avoid frequent changes to the
targeted inflation path. Frequent changes in prices could re
sult, for instance, from supply shocks such as a shortage offood
supply.
• How much should the inflation deviate from the target range?
Experience suggeststhatthe authorities shouldtry to keep the
inflationrate around the target ranges duringthe course ofthe
assessing period. Frequent and large deviations could lead
market participants to believe that the central bank rnight not
meet the target. However, on unusual occasions and as a result
of exogenous shocks, the inflation rate rnight move out ofthe
target range. Moreover, the central bank rnight be unable to
bring the inflation rate into the target range in the short term
because monetary policy affects inflation with a lag. In these
special situations the central bank rnight need to explain the
natureofthe problemto avoid erodingits credibility. Acasethat
should be avoided is that in which supply shocks push the in
fiation rate out ofthe target range.
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